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I.

Introduction

Gilbert Zaragoza faced no good options in 1956. Over the past year, he had developed a
heroin addiction, and partly because of his epilepsy and cognitive impairment, he had trouble
paying for it.1 Consequently, he resorted to dealing small amounts of the drug to sustain his
habit. His world would be upended when an undercover investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics (FBN) and the Los Angeles Police Department uncovered this practice.2 For selling
$27 worth of heroin to a seventeen-year-old, a federal court sentenced Zaragoza to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.3 At twenty-one years old, he faced a life behind
bars. And he was lucky, so he was told, to face this draconian sentence; the judge presiding over
the case remarked to him that “[t]he jury gave you your life.”4 In addition to increasing
mandatory minimum sentencing, the recently passed 1956 Narcotic Control Act had granted the
jury the discretion to recommend the death penalty for anyone who had dealt heroin to minors. 5
Zaragoza’s experience epitomized the federal government’s dramatic shift in the 1950s
towards a more punitive approach to narcotics policy. From 1949 to 1957, the average sentence
for narcotic offenses more than tripled, from 19 months to 61.4 months.6 Additionally, the racial
makeup of those convicted of narcotics offenses shifted towards racial minorities, with the

1

U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Penitentiaries, Of Prisons and Justice: A Selection of the
Writings of James V. Bennett, 88th Congress, 2d Session, 1964, S. Doc 70, 237. Zaragoza reportedly had “an IQ of
69.”
2
U.S. Treasury Department Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, United States
Government Printing Office: Washington (1958), 33.
3
"Dope Peddler, 21, Gets Life Term--no Parole." Los Angeles Times (1923-1995), May 18, 1957.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/167102138?accountid=15172. On the heroin price, "Man Gets Life Term for
$27 Dope Sales," The Hartford Courant (1923-1994), May 19, 1957.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/564156816?accountid=15172.
4
"Dope Peddler, 21, Gets Life Term--no Parole." Los Angeles Times (1923-1995), May 18, 1957,
https://search.proquest.com/docview/167102138?accountid=15172.
5
Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Public Law 728. U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 567-575.
6
U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Penitentiaries, Of Prisons and Justice: A Selection of the
Writings of James V. Bennett, 234.
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percentage of African Americans among those convicted of federal narcotics violations rising
from 13% in 1946 to 53% in 1957.7 As a Latino-American facing a disproportionately punitive
sentence, Zaragoza embodied these broader trends in federal narcotics enforcement.
In 1962, President Kennedy, reflecting a momentary shift away from this severe
enforcement, commuted Zaragoza’s sentence, although another eight years passed before he was
released from prison in 1970.8 Still, the question remains: why did the nation veer so sharply
toward this punitive approach in the 1950s? And why, despite criticism of the criminalization-ofaddiction approach throughout the beginning of the decade, did the federal government double
down in 1956 by strengthening the mandatory minimums first enacted by the U.S. Congress in
the 1951 Boggs Act?
These answers can be found in an emerging alliance between a rising bureaucratic
agency, the Treasury Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics and several congressmen. Chief
among them were Louisiana Rep. Hale Boggs and Texas Senator Price Daniel. To bolster their
profiles, each was eager to exploit nationwide fears by linking narcotics to youth delinquency,
organized crime, and Communism. Created in 1930, the FBN was tasked with managing the
federal government’s growing narcotics enforcement responsibilities, which had originated with
the passage of the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act. While never as powerful as J. Edgar Hoover's
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBN possessed outsized influence largely because of the
zealous and aggressive leadership of its Commissioner, Harry Anslinger, who led the bureau
from its inception to 1962. Anslinger’s skill in navigating the political arena and the media
enabled him both to maintain iron control of the FBN for three decades and gain sway over the

7
8

Ibid.
Larry Harnisch, "Pusher Gets life," The Daily Mirror: Los Angeles History, May 18, 2007.
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public narrative about the threat posed by narcotics. In turn, for ambitious politicians such as
Senator Daniel, these inflated fears offered an opportunistic agenda. The seductive and
seemingly obvious prohibitionary logic—harsher sentences, fewer drugs—drew grassroots
support across the country, deepening political incentives to intensify a punitive narcotics policy.
Harsh enforcement against narcotics use made for easy and effective fear-based politics. The
media and government enjoyed a symbiotic relationship in the 1950s as sensational claims by
government officials in an atmosphere of hysteria drew readership.
Senator Daniel, who chaired a nationwide narcotics probe and spearheaded the 1956
Narcotic Control Act in the Senate, successfully employed this experience to secure the 1956
Democratic nomination for Texas Governor in a contested primary. Daniel steadfastly refused to
listen to the growing number of experts—including lawyers, doctors, and sociologists—who
contested the FBN’s punitive approach that treated addicts like narcotic traffickers, instead
favoring alternatives like the “clinic approach,” which would provide low-cost narcotics to
addicts while they underwent treatment. Anslinger’s status as the ruling “czar” of a federal
bureau granted him a legitimacy in Congress that these dissenting experts lacked. Institutional
failure in part explains the direction of federal narcotics enforcement in the 1950s.
Finally, the international networks and cooperation facilitated by the FBN’s global
enforcement efforts effectively served broader Cold-War era foreign policy goals and enabled
the United States to exert more influence internationally. Anslinger himself noted the possibility
that the control of drugs could model the control of nuclear weapons.9 To give up on the punitive
incarceration approach would be to give up these networks. This paper will explore how these
9

See Harry J. Anslinger and William F. Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics, New York: Arno Press, (1953).
Anslinger and Tompkins write that “The marked success achieved in the international narcotic drug control program
has prompted numerous suggestions that some of its principles be used as a pattern for control in other fields such as
atomic energy and disarmament.” (59)
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factors shaped the direction of federal narcotics policy, resulting in the passage of the 1956
Narcotic Control Act, in spite of mounting criticism of the 1951 Boggs Act.
Several existing works of scholarship inform this study. Many scholars have addressed
broader 20th-century narcotics policy.10 John McWilliams and Alexandra Chasin provide crucial
biographies of Harry Anslinger.11 McWilliams focuses on Anslinger’s bureaucratic skill and
Chasin contextualizes Anslinger’s career in its broader historical moment. Several scholars have
contributed to a more thorough understanding of 1950s federal narcotics policy, particularly the
1951 Boggs Act, by turning our attention from a single individual to city and state
governments.12 Other historians have grappled with anti-narcotic propagandizing efforts
spearheaded by Anslinger in the 1950s.13 Though it does not focus on narcotics, James Gilbert’s

10

See Musto, The American Disease. David Musto in 1973 was one of the first to tackle this history. Also see David
T. Courtwright, Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
(1982). Courtwright examines how changes in the class composition of drug users throughout U.S. history
influenced the direction of narcotics policy. Also see H. Wayne Morgan, Drugs in America: A Social History, 18001980, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, (1981). Morgan provides an excellent social history of drug users that
illustrates that Anslinger’s role as the sole propagandist of narcotics policy is often prone to exaggeration.
11
John C. McWilliams, The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1930-1962.
Newark: University of Delaware Press, (1990). This work represents the first comprehensive work of Anslinger’s
career. Also see John C. McWilliams. “Unsung partner against crime: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 1930-1962,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 113 2 (1989): 207-33. In this article,
McWilliams argues that Anslinger’s success at fighting organized crime is deserving of more praise when assessing
his tenure. On Chasin’s biography, see Alexandra Chasin, Assassin of Youth: A Kaleidoscopic History of Harry J.
Anslinger’s War on Drugs, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (2016). Chasin also examines the entirety of
Anslinger’s career; she argues that Anslinger was largely a product of his time. She contends that his predisposition
towards authoritarian solutions and tendency towards fear of the other shaped his tenure at the FBN.
12
See Amund R. Tallaksen. “Junkies and Jim Crow: The Boggs Act of 1951 and the Racial Transformation of New
Orleans’ Heroin Market.” Journal of Urban History 45, no. 2 (March 2019): 230–46. Tallaksen examines how racial
attitudes and fears of organized crime, particularly in New Orleans, helped spur Hale Boggs, New Orleans’
representative, to action in passing his eponymous Bogg’s Act in 1951. Matthew D. Lassiter. “Pushers, Victims, and
the Lost Innocence of White Suburbia: California’s War on Narcotics during the 1950s.” Journal of Urban History
41, no. 5 (September 2015): 787–807. Lassiter looks broadly at how the moral panic over juvenile delinquency in
the 1950s shaped perceptions about drug policy, with a particular focus on Los Angeles. Such fears were of course
present in Texas, as evidenced by Price Daniel’s correspondences with his constituents. Also see Phil Nicholas and
Andrew Churchill, “The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the States, and the Origins of Modern Drug Enforcement in
the United States, 1950–1962,” Contemporary Drug Problems 39, no. 4 (December 2012): 595–640, which focuses
heavily on state level legislation. Also see Jonathon Erlen et. al. Federal Drug Control: The Evolution of Policy and
Practice, Binghamton, NY: Pharmaceutical Products Press (2004). Erlen and Spillane take an approach centered
more on the role of the pharmaceutical industry in shaping federal narcotics policy.
13
For example see, Matthew R. Pembleton, "The Voice of the Bureau: How Frederic Sondern and the Bureau of
Narcotics Crafted a Drug War and Shaped Popular Understanding of Drugs, Addiction, and Organized Crime in the
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A Cycle of Outrage is invaluable in describing the cultural and political environment in which
the FBN operated as it pushed for ever-harsher legislation in the 1950s, although Gilbert does not
adequately cover the intersection of fears of teenage narcotics use with broader fears of youth
delinquency.14 More recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of external factors in
shaping federal narcotics policy.15 Kathleen Frydl’s The Drug Wars in America represents an
increasing shift in the literature towards international explanations, running the risk of
downplaying domestic dynamics.16 The lessons that inform and inspire this study derive from
areas as diverse as public choice theory, Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse, Howard
Becker’s Outsiders, and the organizational synthesis literature.17

1950s." The Journal of American Culture 38, no. 2 (06, 2015): 113-129. Pembleton looks at how Anslinger shaped
public opinion on narcotics in the 1950s, particularly through his relationship with Reader’s Digest reporter Frederic
Sondern, Jr. Also see Jonathan Marshall, “Cooking the Books: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the China Lobby
and Cold War Propaganda, 1950-1962 帳簿をこま.” The Asian-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus 11, no. 37
(September 15, 2013): 1–32. Marshall examines how Anslinger crafted an elaborate conspiracy of narcotics flowing
from Communist China to gain support for his bureau and preferred narcotics policy. Additionally see John F.
Galliher, David P. Keys, and Michael Elsner. “Lindesmith v. Anslinger: An Early Government Victory in the Failed
War on Drugs.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 88, no. 2 (1998): 661-682. Galliher, Keys,
and Elsner examine how Anslinger worked to discredit those who challenged his narcotics narrative, particularly
focusing on his intimidation of the Indiana University sociologist Alfred Lindesmith. Also see Douglas Clark
Kinder, and William O. Walker. "Stable Force in a Storm: Harry J. Anslinger and United States Narcotic Foreign
Policy, 1930-1962." The Journal of American History 72, no. 4 (1986): 908-27. Kinder and Walker focus
particularly on Anslinger’s bureaucratic skill and expertise. Finally see Eric C. Schneider, Smack: Heroin and the
American City, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press (2011). Schneider provides a valuable
social history of heroin use, focusing particularly on New York City. His book, and Chapter 4 in particular, “The
Panic over Adolescent Heroin Use,” provides crucial insights into Anslinger, Boggs, and Daniel’s efforts to drive
support for harsh legislation in the 1950s.
14
James Burkhart Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
15
See William B. McAllister, "Harry Anslinger Saves the World: National Security Imperatives and the 1937
Marihuana Tax Act," The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 33, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 37-62. McAllister focuses
on how national security concerns shaped the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act. He writes that “[a]ccounts of post-1945 US
drug policy would likely benefit from considering this aspect” (61). Also see David R. Bewley-Taylor, The United
States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997, London: Pinter (1999). Bewley-Taylor provides a
comprehensive history of U.S. international narcotics policy in the 20th century.
16
Kathleen Frydl, The Drug Wars in America: 1940-1973, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2013). One of
Frydl’s central claims that the intensification of federal narcotics control during this period was not shaped by a
legitimate desire to curtail narcotics use. Instead, the war on drugs served other policy goals, such as a desire to exert
control over international partners and domestic cities.
17
See Howard S. Becker. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1963. Becker conceives of Anslinger as a “moral entrepreneur,” particularly with regard to his role in the passage of
the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act. On the organizational synthesis, see Louis Galambos. "The Emerging Organizational
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This study builds on ample primary source material. The Price Daniel Papers provide
insight into the passage of the 1956 Narcotic Control Act, a period that remains understudied in
the literature. This paper fills that void. Containing correspondence between Daniel and his
constituents as well as figures like Anslinger, the collection reveals the dynamics that drove that
piece of punitive legislation through the Senate, often eponymously referred to as the Daniel
Act.18 The Daniel Papers additionally provide unique insight into how punitive legislation was
perceived in the popular consciousness. Beyond the Daniel Papers, the Harry Anslinger Papers,
contemporary media accounts, a variety of reports on narcotics, academic publications, and the
Congressional Record prove useful in elucidating the factors that drove the federal government
to double down on punitive narcotics legislation in the 1950s.
Through a close examination of the historical record, this paper will argue that Harry
Anslinger and politicians such as Senator Price Daniel exploited and exacerbated public fears
surrounding narcotics use for political and bureaucratic gain. Between the passage of the 1951
Boggs Act and 1956 Narcotic Control Act, popular concerns over a Communist heroin
conspiracy and youth delinquency only deepened, helping to explain why the federal government
doubled down on the punitive approach to drug enforcement. Price Daniel’s 1955 narcotics
probe and the spread of resulting anti-drug propaganda such as the film Dope Traffic U.S.A.
stand out as crucial catalysts for the 1956 legislation. Racism and a desire to establish
international networks of control only further incentivized such an approach over alternative

Synthesis in Modern American History." The Business History Review 44, no. 3 (1970): 279-90. Also see Louis
Galambos. "Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational
Synthesis." The Business History Review 57, no. 4 (1983): 471-93.
18
Douglas Clark Kinder, "Bureaucratic Cold Warrior: Harry J. Anslinger and Illicit Narcotics Traffic," Pacific
Historical Review 50, no. 2 (1981): 185. Douglass Kinder reports that “[o]n the relationship between Daniel and
Anslinger, little exists in the Daniel Papers at the Texas State Library.” While Anslinger and Daniel were not
constantly in contact, the collection does contain correspondences between the two men dating to Daniel’s time as
both Senator and Governor of Texas.
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treatments, such as the clinic approach favored by the New York Academy of Medicine in 1955.
The harsh legislation proved to be exceedingly popular with Daniel’s constituents, and he made
effective use of the legislation in his successful 1956 Texas gubernatorial campaign, highlighting
how political (mal)incentives contributed to the federal government’s turn to the punitive
approach in the 1950s. Although the government pivoted away from some of these harsh
sentences during the Kennedy administration as Anslinger’s preferred approach came under fire,
lessons of the failure of this punitive approach to drug enforcement would later be forgotten,
highlighting the nation’s all-too-frequent collective myopia.
A better understanding of why the federal government intensified its investment in the
criminalization approach in the 1950s is significant for several reasons. During this crucial
period, both the mandatory minimum drug sentencing and asset forfeiture paradigm emerged;
during what Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. dubbed the “war on narcotics,” the federal
government sketched the contours of the later “war on drugs.”19 Mandatory minimum prison
sentences, today widely condemned in the academic literature, contributed to the rise of mass
incarceration.20 Moreover, federal narcotics policy during this period provides a crucial lens
through which to understand broader policy goals of the federal government, including its efforts
to suppress the spread of Communism. Additionally, a close study of the historical record during
this period provides insight into the dynamics that contribute to moral panics surrounding
narcotics use.21 A study of the 1950s also helps explain the enduring appeal of the

“Excerpt from Address By Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr. Attorney General of the United States. Prepared for
Delivery before the National Association of Attorneys General,” December 10, 1954, 4, Box 82, Price Daniel
Papers, Texas State Library Archives (Hereafter PD Papers).
20
For a look at some of the later consequences of the war on drugs on mass incarceration see Michelle Alexander,
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, New York: New Press (2010).
21
The rapid intensification of narcotics sentencing during this period also underscores what David Musto has
identified as the cyclical nature of narcotics enforcement in the United States: a period of tolerance tends to be
followed by public outcry, which results in enforcement efforts that are eventually deemed too draconian. In this
19
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criminalization approach to drug enforcement, despite its ineffectiveness. Finally, the period
provides yet more evidence that federal narcotics policy has been totally divorced from scientific
evidence throughout its entirety. The Global Commission on Drug Policy found that, rather than
scientific or health data, “historical and cultural precedents” have largely driven narcotics
policy.22 Congress’ unshakeable commitment to Anslinger’s punitive approach during this period
emblematizes this reality. Thus the 1950s represents a critical and underappreciated period for
study of federal narcotics policy.

II.

The FBN Gains Strength and Influence

Harry Anslinger was born to immigrant parents in 1892, in Altoona, Pennsylvania, a
working-class railroad community.23 He began working at the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
after finishing the 8th grade, and obtained an Associate’s Degree from Penn State in 1915.24 An
eye injury prevented him from serving in World War I, but he joined the diplomatic corps of the
State Department and held positions in The Netherlands, Germany, Venezuela, and the
Bahamas. 25 His work against alcohol smuggling in the Bahamas earned him a position in the
Treasury Department’s Prohibition Unit. He received a Bachelor of Laws degree from the
Washington College of Law in 1930. That same year, he was appointed by President Hoover as
the first Commissioner of the newly-established Federal Bureau of Narcotics. From this position,
he exerted unparalleled control of the nation's anti-narcotic laws. The outbreak of World War II
marked a unique opportunity for Anslinger to expand this control and grow his influence.

case, politicians and bureaucrats fueled much of the outcry. See David F. Musto, The American Disease. New
Haven: Yale University Press, (1973).
22
Global Commission on Drug Policy, "Classification of Psychoactive Substances: When Science Was Left
Behind," (2019), 4.
23
For the most comprehensive biographies of Anslinger, see McWilliams, The Protectors and Chasin, Assassin of
Youth. Each deeply investigates Anslinger’s life before he headed the FBN.
24
“A Life of Service: Harry Jacob Anslinger," Drug Enforcement Agency Museum, Arlington, Virginia.
25
Ibid.
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As the United States fought towards victory in World War II, Anslinger’s FBN enjoyed a
series of triumphs in its crusade against narcotics and successfully tied drugs to international
affairs. During the leadup to the war, Anslinger worked with the U.S. Military to stockpile
massive amounts of essential narcotics such as opium to ensure adequate morphine for the war
effort.26 The war itself fortuitously dried up the supply of illicit narcotics across the country. 27
Within only a few years of a signature legislative victory of the FBN, the Marihuana Tax Act of
1937, federal narcotics offenses plummeted.28 For Anslinger, this was positive proof that the
FBN’s efforts to combat the narcotics trade by attacking suppliers worked. In the international
realm, the League of Nations’ Opium Advisory Committee continued to function despite the
war.29 Even as total war raged globally, the FBN pursued its preferred punitive enforcement
regime as a model for cooperative international policing, justifying what might otherwise seem a
distraction from more imperative war-time matters.30 In 1947, US World reported that the “best
precedents” for “abolishing war through absolute limitation of armaments” could be found in
narcotics control.31 In fact, the FBN latched onto war-time exigencies and fears to align its
agenda with national security concerns. Anslinger worked to tie his efforts at suppressing the
narcotics trade directly to the broader war effort, particularly with regard to Japan. In his notes,
he recorded that “Treas. Dept. in war against japanese narcotics policy 10 years [sic]” and that

McAllister, “Harry Anslinger Saves the World,” 54.
Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 48.
28
Nicholas and Churchill, “The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the States, and the Origins of Modern Drug
Enforcement in the United States, 1950–1962,” 604.
29
Harry J. Anslinger, "Drug Addiction: A World Problem," Reel 1, Box 1, File 8, Harry Anslinger Papers, Special
Collections Library, Pennsylvania State University (Hereafter HA Papers).
30
“American Delegations to International Conferences, Congresses and Expositions and American Representation
on International Institutions and Commissions with Relevant Data,” Washington: United States Government
Printing Office (1941), 62-65.
31
“Narcotics Control—A Pattern,” US World, September, 1947, Reel 18, Box 7, File 16, HA Papers.
26
27
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“[t]his chemical warfare as deadly as prohibited gases.” 32 Media outlets echoed Anslinger,
reporting that the Japanese used narcotics “as an instrument of national policy for the last decade
to poison the American people.”33 In its 1945 article, “How Opium, a Jap Weap, Perils the
World,” Sunday Mirror Magazine cited Anslinger’s claim that Japan was waging “war against
western civilization” with narcotics.34 To fight narcotics was to fight fascism; Anslinger would
tap into this war-time experience long after WWII, when he sought to link narcotics to a
conspiracy organized by a foreign adversary to advance his goals. Anslinger thus used these
years to build the reputation of the FBN and characteristically exaggerated his Manichean
rhetoric of the evil enemy from without, in this case Japan, preying on the good society within.35
His agency emerged as a model of bureaucratic efficacy as it vitally contributed to the war effort,
and its successes gained recognition and praise from lawmakers.36 To congressmen, Anslinger
stood out as an effective administrator who possessed unrivaled knowledge about narcotics, now
defined as both a vital domestic and foreign policy issue. This social conservative who had been
involved in the regulation of psychoactive substances dating to his work for the Bureau of
Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930 was more powerful than ever before.
Yet as Anslinger’s reputation grew in Washington, trouble brewed below the surface. He
fully expected the flow of illicit narcotics to resume after the war’s conclusion. The FBN also

“AMERICAN POLICY Constitution follows our flag JAPANESE POLICY Opium precedes their flag,” Reel 1,
Box 1, File 9, HA Papers, 3-4.
33
Hendrik de Lecuw, "Drugs Helping Japan to Hold Invaded Lands: Narcotics used for Decade to Weaken
Americans as Well as in War in China," New York Herald Tribune (1926-1962), Feb 15, 1942,
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1267762588?accountid=15172.
34
Gerald R. Scott, “How Opium, a Jap Weap, Perils the World,” Sunday Mirror Magazine, August 12, 1945, Reel 2,
Box 1, File 13, HA Papers.
35
Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 67.
36
The Senate confirmed Anslinger’s nomination by President Truman to the United Nations Social Council's
Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1946. "Senate Confirms Anslinger." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun
07, 1946. https://search.proquest.com/docview/107483496?accountid=15172.
32
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feared that soldiers themselves would return home addicted.37 Furthermore, dissenting voices
challenged many of Anslinger’s exaggerated claims about the dangers of narcotics. In 1940 the
sociologist Alfred Lindesmith published his article, “Dope Fiend Mythology,” in a respected
scholarly journal, arguing that the best way to combat narcotics use was to reduce the profit
motive from the illicit trade.38 The article represented fertile and respectable intellectual grounds
for later critics to attack the FBN’s punitive approach in the 1950s. Lindesmith’s article
infuriated Anslinger and his allies. Federal Judge Twain Michelsen, a close friend of Anslinger
throughout his fight for harsh legislation, published a response article in the same journal; he
excoriated Lindesmith and others, such as Representative John M. Coffee of Washington, who
had attacked the FBN’s enforcement efforts.39 In 1944, a commission appointed by New York
City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia published findings that directly challenged the FBN’s claims
about a link between narcotics use and crime. The New York City commission’s report also
argued against the so-called “gateway” theory that marijuana use led to the use of other “harder”
narcotics. Anslinger quickly condemned the report, with several prominent voices joining him,
including the Journal of the American Medical Association.40 Such efforts to combat these
narratives highlight Anslinger’s commitment to controlling public perceptions of the narcotic
problem. In the near term, however, these dissenting voices lacked organizational coherence;
they were disparate and isolated voices. As such, they could not counterbalance the institutional
unity that gave Anslinger a base of strength. And it is important to not read back the present into

Harry Anslinger, “The sheriff and narcotic enforcement,” International Criminal Police Review (December 1952),
318, Reel 2, Box 1, File 11, HA Papers.
38
A.R. Lindesmith, "Dope Fiend Mythology,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 31, No. 2 (1940).
39
Twain Michelsen, "Lindesmith's Mythology," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 31, No. 4 (1940). This
text remained relevant through the 1950s, as Senator Daniel possessed a copy of it and echoed many of its
arguments.
40
"Marihuana Still a Menace, Journal Insists," The Courier-Journal (1923-2001), Apr 26, 1945, 12
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1865143438?accountid=15172.
37
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the past—the FBN’s preferred approach of increased criminalization possessed an alluring if
blunt logic that appealed to America’s Puritan sensibilities.
Following World War II, as both the FBN and its critics had predicted, the United States
did indeed experience a rise in narcotics use.41 Between 1945 and 1951, combined federal and
state drug commitments—a noisy proxy for overall narcotics use—roughly doubled from about
1,500 to roughly 3,000.42 Although it was concentrated in a small handful of cities, and the
overall number represented a tiny fraction of the population, this increase in narcotics addiction
spurred significant media attention. By providing the media with sensationalist tales of organized
crime, Anslinger and the FBN contributed to the scare. This symbiotic relationship between
government officials and the media partially explains the sensationalist coverage of narcotics in
the 1950s.
Further fanning the flames was a rise in the rate of teenage narcotic addiction, which,
Anslinger reported, “struck [the United States] in 1949 with hurricane velocity.”43 This apparent
spike in youth addiction was deeply troubling in a country that was adapting to the emergence of
“teen” culture. With more Americans attending and completing high school than ever before,
teenage years were increasingly viewed as a distinct phase of life. Hollywood movies, pulp
fiction, and television honed in on “rebellious adolescence” and raised alarm that allegedly

41

Alfred Lindesmith, Opiate Addiction, Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press of Illinois (1947), 196-203.
Lindesmith, like the FBN, predicted this rise in the years following the war.
42
U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Penitentiaries, Of Prisons and Justice, 161.
43
Untitled and undated (presumably early 1950s) question and answer with Harry Anslinger, 1, Reel 20, Box 8, File
14, HA Papers. Regarding arrests being a messy proxy, see U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in the Federal Criminal Code, “Illicit Narcotics Traffic Hearings: Part 2,” June 17 and 18, 1955, 339. Philadelphia
Mayor Joseph S. Clark noted that “I should note for the record that the statistics on narcotics arrests can be
misleading. It is one of the categories — along with gambling, prositution and others — in which a police
department can ‘look good’ by one of two methods. The first is to make few arrests, and point to the figures as proof
that ‘there is no drug traffic here.’ The second is to pile up an impressive number of arrests of known addicts, and
use the statistics to show that the police are stamping out the traffic.” Thus arrests do not necessarily reflect drug use
perfectly.
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working-class, urban teen-age or black culture—rock-n-roll, slang, underage drinking, scuffles
with the police and confrontations with teachers—threatened family stability and social order.44
Now adolescence was likewise apparently being threatened by illicit narcotics, similarly
associated with urban street culture. While the country did indeed observe a rise in teenage drug
use, even more dramatic was the rise in sensationalist pieces that exaggerated the scope of the
problem.45
In 1950 and 1951, popular magazines like Time and Reader’s Digest reported on this
surge in hyperbolic fashion. Exposés of the “teenage drug addiction menace” were ubiquitous.
One pamphlet intended to inform parents reported that “Our teen-agers today are menaced by a
danger more virulent than cancer, as deadly as the H-bomb. The spine-chilling terror DRUG
ADDICTION has become a personal horror to thousands of youngsters.”46 In a country
grappling with a new epoch—one marked by transformative technologies like the hydrogen
bomb—teenage drug addiction was viewed as yet another threat to traditional ways of living. In
1951, newspapers and magazines across the country reported on teenage narcotics use, even
though it was concentrated in New York and a few other large cities. Fears that addiction would
sweep the country like a plague were widespread. Undoubtedly magazines liked sizzling stories
that were sure to sell more copies. Yet such fears aligned with the FBN’s view of addiction as a
communicable disease. The FBN presented combating teenage drug use as a zero-sum game:
either you fought it actively or you became complicit. As it pushed for harsher sentences, such
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fears proved useful. Anslinger reported that the increase was due “to the fact that these young
people have been associating with criminals, begin smoking marihuana and then graduate to
heroin” and found the rate of heroin use among marijuana users to be “shockingly high.”47
Throughout his tenure, Anslinger and his allies remained acutely aware of the importance
of public opinion. On a San Francisco radio station, the aforementioned Judge Twain Michelsen
remarked in 1951 that “[a]gainst the efforts of such men as Commissioner Anslinger, we find
walking in our very midst the ugly figure of PUBLIC APATHY, a psychological barrier almost
as dangerous as narcotics poison itself.”48 M.L. Harney, assistant to Anslinger, reported at a
convention of police chiefs that critics of Anslinger, such as those on the LaGuardia Committee,
had created “a climate of public opinion which has favored the spread of narcotic addiction.” 49
He elaborated that “there is another line which in my opinion does much harm where younger
people are concerned. I refer to the argument in some quarters that drug addiction is purely a
medical question [sic] that the drug addict is nothing more or less than a sick person who must be
dealt with only as such.”50 The FBN was not a fan of nuance; those who challenged its blackand-white view of narcotics enforcement were seen as promoting teenage addiction. Dismissing
these critics, Anslinger advanced a hardline view of sentencing. Throughout the decade,
Anslinger remained keenly aware of opportunities to advance this message, taking full advantage
of opportunities to combat “PUBLIC APATHY.” Anslinger and his FBN, particularly during the
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Kefauver Committee hearings, significantly contributed to this atmosphere of exaggerated fears
and did little to combat it until they had secured their desired punitive legislation.

III.

The Kefauver Committee and the Boggs Act

In 1950, the United States Senate launched the Special Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, chaired by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver.51
Spearheaded by its eponymous chairman, the Kefauver Committee was launched to investigate
organized crime, increasingly viewed as a threat to social cohesion in the years following World
War II. These televised hearings generated enormous public interest at a time when many
Americans were purchasing their first television sets. Life remarked a year later that “[t]he
Senate investigation into interstate crime was almost the sole subject of national conversation.
Newspapers gave it 10 times as much space as the Korean war.”52 The sensational nature of the
hearings significantly raised Kefauver’s profile nationally, testifying to the emerging power of
television.
Among the range of issues his committee addressed, it highlighted narcotics. The
spectacle of these narcotics hearings, held in Jessup, Maryland and Lexington, Kentucky,
generated enormous public interest. The choice of Lexington was significant as it was home to a
federal “narcotics farm” that treated addicts East of the Mississippi River. 53 Employees at
Lexington were some of the most prominent individuals to challenge the FBN’s favored punitive

51

Born in 1903, Estes Kefauver attended the University of Tennessee and Yale Law School before coming to
Capitol Hill as a representative from Tennessee's Third Congressional District in 1939. A staunch supporter of
Roosevelt’s New Deal, Kefauver was elected to the Senate in 1948. Organized crime was only one of Kefauver’s
targets; he was also a committed antimonpolist. For a comprehensive biography of Kefauver, see Charles L.
Fontenay, Estes Kefauver: A Biography, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press (1980).
52
“Who’s a Liar.” Life Magazine 30, no. 14 (April 2, 1951), 22.
53
For an excellent history of this Louisville facility, see Nancy D. Campbell, Discovering Addiction: The Science
and Politics of Substance Abuse Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press (2007), 54-82.

Horvath 16
approach to drug addiction, but it was this approach that won the day at the hearings.54 The
committee represented a crucial public forum to espouse his views on optimal narcotics policy.
The journalist John Gerrity later noted in 1952 that, at these hearings, “the scare came to life.”55
He wrote that the hearings went a long way towards explaining “the great national drug scare
that has recently gripped many an American home.”56
The Kefauver Committee didn’t just serve a public relations function. It also provided the
FBN a key opportunity to lobby for longer sentences.57 Characteristically, the FBN was very
effective at staying on message and specific in its request for harsh legislation. Two FBN agents
testified before Anslinger. Richard G. Moser, Chief Counsel of the Kefauver Committee, asked
one of these agents, “[w]hat is your view as to the best way of stopping this use by young people,
that seems to be suddenly skyrocketing at the present time?” Agent Ellis replied, “extremely
severe sentences for any person selling narcotics to any other person, youthful or otherwise.” 58
He pointed to Detroit, which had recently toughened sentencing, arguing that “the peddling has
fallen off considerably,” as had quality, although “the price of narcotics has more than
doubled.”59 Of course, dissenters such as Lindesmith had predicted such dynamics, but there was
little appetite for critics of the FBN in this environment. Anslinger responded to a question about
the LaGuardia report by noting that “[i]t gives you quite a jolt to have the 17-year-old youngsters
sit across the desk from you and start to argue that marijuana is not dangerous because they have
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read this report.”60 Anslinger shrewdly chose to focus on 17-year-olds, given a wider set of
concerns emerging about juvenile delinquency, street gangs, and predatory teenagers.61 Movies,
magazines, social psychology, and congressional committees participated in the circulation of
fears about youth corruption by such forces. Anslinger easily tapped into this rhetoric, employing
it to his benefit.
Wielding the rhetoric of crisis, Anslinger used his time before the Kefauver Committee to
advertise the efficacy of his bureau and lobby for increased appropriations. When Moser
questioned him about the size of his bureau, Anslinger’s responded, “[a]bout 188 and that is like
a piece of blotting paper to mop up the ocean.”62 Tellingly, Anslinger responded to Chairman
Kefauver’s question about the importance of longer sentences by noting that “with 2 percent of
the Federal enforcement officers [the FBN has] accounted for 10 percent of the prison
population” and therefore “[w]e need better sentences.” 63 For Anslinger, “better sentences”
meant longer sentences; such logic proved seductively enduring in subsequent federal and state
narcotics policy. His allusions to an alleged flow of heroin from Communist China only
heightened the stakes.64 More importantly, Anslinger was the sole federal official who declared
the existence of the mafia, an organization that captivated the public.65 The FBN’s allegation
before the Kefauver Committee that “Lucky” Luciano controlled the narcotics trade in the
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United States from Sicily not only enthralled the nation but secured the support of a leading U.S.
senator and his team of colleagues.66 Perhaps more surprisingly, this “investigatory” committee
accepted at face-value Anslinger’s most inflated assertions regarding Luciano and the Sicilian
mafia; the mere fact of his testimony served as “data.” Indeed, this dynamic provided further
gravitas to the FBN’s efforts to combat the narcotics trade. 67
Anslinger contemporaneously echoed the arguments he expressed before the Kefauver
Committee to the media. He frequently expressed his concerns regarding the LaGuardia report to
journalists, including to the New York Herald Tribune, which had a circulation of roughly half a
million readers in the 1950s.68 To the New York Times, Anslinger argued that “I should think that
narcotics peddling to youngsters is far worse than kidnapping.”69 The FBN’s argument that drug
dealing was worse than kidnapping—or even murder—(crimes carrying the heaviest of
punishments) recurred throughout the decade as it pushed for harsher sentencing. Always the
keen media operator, Anslinger appeared on Eleanor Roosevelt’s television program roughly a
month after his Maryland testimony. As reported in The New York Times, he argued on the
program that “legislation should brand drug addiction as a communicable disease, thus isolating
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its victims from the community”: if consumers were victims then all sellers were pathogens.70
Whatever the venue, Anslinger “advocated more stringent penalties for narcotics dealers and
asked additional personnel for local agencies combatting [sic] the sale of narcotics.” 71 Bipartisan
concerns about teenage drug use were a crucial raison d’être for harsher sentencing.72
Yet Anslinger’s assumptions did not go entirely unchallenged by his contemporaries.
Following Anslinger’s testimony, an unnamed witness who had been institutionalized for drug
use reported that “[p]eople call you vile names and they want to put you in jail, but the public
never gets out and tries to help you, they just try to put you behind bars, and when you come out
you do the same thing over again. Your system is run down.”73 Anslinger’s overall control of the
crime-and-punishment framework, however, meant that such witnesses offered their testimonies
from a position of stigmatization, even before their words hit the air. Chairman Kefauver
abruptly ended this witness’s testimony following that comment. Anslinger’s charisma and status
stemming from his role as commissioner of a major federal organization lent him legitimacy that
this witness simply did not possess. It is precisely this prestige differential that also helps explain
why Anslinger was able to counteract challenges to his preferred approach such as those
mounted by Lindesmith. Lindesmith’s appeals—he often cited the so-called British system,
where doctors prescribed low-cost narcotics to treat addicts—fell on deaf ears.74 Critics of the
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punitive approach were not even given a serious voice at the Kefauver hearings. Framed by the
imperative to expose criminal and social conspiracies and “the mob,” there was no space for
public health interpretations. Thus, faced with a real, albeit exaggerated, increase in narcotic use,
Congress turned without hesitation to Anslinger and the FBN for a policy prescription.
Fears of a torrent of teenage drug use culminated in the passage of the Boggs Act in
October, 1951. The final report of the Kefauver Committee concluded that “America has been
jolted to its foundations by the discovery that youngsters... are using narcotic drugs, many to the
point of addiction.”75 To ameliorate this issue, the Committee called for an increase in prison
sentences, although it refused to explicitly condone the mandatory minimum sentencing that the
Boggs Act enacted months later.76 Seizing in part on the uproar generated by the Kefauver
Committee, Rep. Hale Boggs of Louisiana spearheaded punitive legislation that aligned with
Anslinger’s prescriptions.
The Boggs Act increased sentencing for narcotics offenses and instituted mandatory
minimum sentences for second and third-time offenders. This shift towards punitive sentencing
was perceived as stemming the spread of addiction, which was seen throughout the 1950s as a
communicable social problem.77 As Frydl argues, the logic of mandatory minimum sentencing
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becomes obvious when one views drugs through this prism of epidemic: to stop a virus, one must
quarantine.78 While the Boggs Act was aimed in principal at targeting large international
traffickers, who were seen as the biggest vector, it harbored the potential of imprisoning smalltime dealers or even those who were merely addicted and caught with narcotics.79 The absurdity
of Anslinger’s small bureau being tasked with stemming the flow of narcotics was never fully
appreciated on Capitol Hill. Appearing to have learned little from the era of alcohol prohibition,
Congress took the FBN at its word that enhanced sentencing would combat the flow of narcotics
and staunch the contagion. Senator Wiley concurred with the FBN’s approach at the hearings,
noting that “when efficiency is in the picture you can get results. And if you couple with that, as
you said, stiff sentences, then you have a deterrent to these peddlers getting into the game, in
view of the fact that there is tremendous money in it for them.”80 Of course, the difficulty in
ensuring such “efficiency” and the fact that many “peddlers” were in “the game” to fund an
existing addiction were not appreciated by Wiley. All too often small-time peddlers were
conflated with large international cartels, and these small-time peddlers were easier to apprehend
and convict.81 One can speculate that this conflation was exacerbated by the reality that many of
these peddlers were members of minority groups seen as corrupting white youth.
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This faith in the FBN can largely be traced in great confidence in Anslinger’s ability as
an administrator. In the face of moral panic regarding teenage drug addiction, Anslinger
embodied the 1950s “liberal consensus” that effective government could act as a force for
effective management of social and economic challenges. Representative Canfield (R-NY)
observed that “in [his]work on the House Appropriations Committee [he had] never met a more
able, a more sincere administrator than Dr. Anslinger.”82 This mistaking of Anslinger for a
doctor was all too common in the 1950s—after all, how could a man with such expertise on
addiction and narcotics not possess a medical degree? Anslinger himself often positioned himself
as a unique expert on the problem.83
Thus it was largely law enforcement, and not doctors, that drove legislation on narcotics.
Canfield praised a New Jersey judge who echoed Anslinger’s more exaggerated rhetoric from
the 1930s when he remarked while sentencing a narcotics dealer to seven years in prison that
“[n]o girl walking the streets would be safe with a man under the influence of this devilish drug.
Young girls raped, people murdered—that’s the story of the highway of marihuana.”84 Although
narcotics were seen as corrupting to teenagers throughout the country, they were perceived as
posing an especially acute threat to young women. Such fears of corruption of femininity were
hardly novel; at the turn of the century, Chinese Americans were perceived as corrupting white
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women with opium.85 The resurgence in fears of such corruption in the 1950s reflects the broader
social turbulence of the period. Anslinger employed these fears in the 1930s to secure prohibitive
marijuana legislation and they proved fruitful again in the 1950s as he pushed for more punitive
legislation.
Anslinger’s reputation only grew in Congress in the early 1950s, with Senator Paul
Douglas of Illinois noting that “I do not know Mr. Anslinger personally, but year after year I
keep hearing comments about the fine, devoted, and tireless job he is performing quietly, with a
small staff, in a continually uphill battle against smugglers and dope peddlers.”86 Douglas, a New
Deal liberal, “[proposed] that we start recognizing our outstanding public servants by awarding
them citations and cash bonuses” and cited Anslinger as a perfect candidate.87 Anslinger
possessed such a sterling reputation that a year later, several independent Democrats even
approached Anslinger, a Republican, about the possibility of running for Vice President.88 It was
this reputation that led Congress to place its faith in Anslinger’s more punitive sentences to
combat an apparent rise in teenage addiction, which became a stand-in for threats to the
American family and communal order.
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IV.

After the Boggs Act: a Brief Reprieve from Juvenile Delinquency, but a
New Threat from China
In the months following the implementation of the Boggs Act, many came to realize that

fears about a scourge of teenage drug use had perhaps been exaggerated. In February 1952, the
Daily Boston Globe penned the article, “Teen-Age Drug Addicts Fewer Now, Anslinger Says.”89
Anslinger cited his 1951 enforcement efforts as being responsible for the decline. With punitive
legislation secured at the federal level, Anslinger was more comfortable acknowledging that
much had been exaggerated by the media. And after all, he had to show that his enforcement
methods were successful at combating narcotics use if he was ever to obtain harsher legislation
at the federal level or “little Boggs Acts” at the state level. Reflecting on the hearings, Anslinger
noted in the October 1951 edition of Reader’s Digest that:
The parades of pathetic witnesses before these investigators have given the impression
that a large number of our young people are menaced by marijuana and heroin.
Fortunately, this is not true. The increase in juvenile drug addiction, horrifying though it
is, is limited to a few localities.90
Although fears of epidemic teenage drug use had centered largely on white middle-class users,
the simple reality was that the increase in heroin in the 1950s was largely limited to black and
Latino populations in a few urban areas, particularly New York City.91 The Los Angeles Police
Department would even conclude that “[n]arcotics are not being used by Los Angeles teenagers
to the extent portrayed by recent sensational ‘exposes.’”92 Ultimately, fears about the corruption
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of white youths led to a crackdown against minority drug users in a select few areas.93 This
moral panic about white teenagers helps explain why narcotics received disproportionate
attention relative to alcohol in the 1950s. That minorities bore the brunt of sentencing further
explains why Congress largely ignored criticism of the FBN’s approach. This fear of the
corruption, defilement, and degradation of white people was integral to earlier efforts to combat
drugs internationally; a British delegate to the newly formed United Nations Commission on
Narcotics Drugs noted in 1948 that without “the white drug problem in the USA... [the]
suppression of the raw material and their indigenous consumption in a relatively harmless form
would not have carried on as far as it has.”94 Fears of white drug use domestically fueled a desire
for punitive international enforcement. Anslinger had no qualms about deploying threats to
whiteness when pushing for Senator Daniel’s punitive legislation roughly a decade later,
although he understood that the moral panic surrounding white teenage drug use was largely
unfounded.
Anslinger’s February 1952 appearance with the journalist John Gerrity on The
Georgetown University Radio Forum illustrates how he capitalized on the cyclical nature of
moral panic surrounding teenage drug use in the 1950s.95 Gerrity’s recent Harper’s Magazine
article noted that “as for the widely publicized ‘drug menace’ which is supposed to be
threatening the future of teen-agers by the hundreds of thousands, it simply doesn't exist.”96
Gerrity added, “The Federal Narcotics Bureau, which knew the true facts, abandoned an earlier
effort to quell the frenetic alarms, fearful that—as one official put it—‘we'd get our brains beaten
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out.’”97 Although at first glance surprising, Anslinger described Gerrity’s article as “a good, cool
and calm, calculated analysis of the problem.”98 Positioning himself as the model bureaucratic
professional, he explained that “in our reports to the Congress, to the United Nations, to the
Senate Crime Committee, we tried to be factual. However, people were drawn into a vortex of
hysteria.”99
Yet once one understands that Anslinger had already secured punitive sentencing—
sentencing endorsed by Gerrity as the solution to the problem—Anslinger’s approach becomes
clearer. He rode the wave of fear to secure legislation, but presented himself as the “rational”
voice on the problem, playing a double game. If one doubts this interpretation, note that Gerrity
himself noted on the broadcast that “it was very good and proper that a certain amount of
alarming be done in order to alert the nation to the menace as it did exist.”100 In explaining on the
broadcast why barbiturates were not put under federal control, Anslinger remarked that “[i]t
would make our Bureau about as popular as the Prohibition Bureau was.”101 For Anslinger, who
had served as Assistant Commissioner of Prohibition in the Division of Foreign Control in the
Prohibition Unit, such a fear remained visceral. Throughout his career, securing public opinion
remained vital.
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Anslinger had to balance using public outrage to
secure legislation with the risk that such outrage would
lead to questioning about the efficacy of his bureau.
Gerrity effectively captures this precarious balancing act
in his article, noting that “[a]pparently we persist in being
a nation of calamity-howlers whose violent surges of zeal
for reform sometimes hinder, rather than help, the
organizations that could do some genuine good.”102
Anslinger and his agency always played both sides. While
downplaying the magnitude of the crisis, for example, his
bureau published a pamphlet, “Living Death: The Truth
About Drug Addiction,” that hardly quelled fears.103 This widely distributed pamphlet featured
numerous exaggerated depictions of teenage drug addiction. One such image is reproduced
above, illustrating how Anslinger’s FBN contributed to the moral panic even as they
simultaneously downplayed the magnitude of teenage drug addiction across the country.104 Note
that the boy depicted was white, further preying on fears of this “physical and moral
degradation” of teenage youth. Building on the language of pandemic, the pamphlet instructed
teenagers to “[a]void a drug addict the same as you would a ‘Typhoid Mary’ because his plague
is just as contagious.”105 The pamphlet also argued that “peddlers or their agents” were
promoting the “foulest racket in existence” in their efforts to “snare” teenagers.106 Anslinger
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embraced these “violent surges of zeal” regarding youth delinquency prior to the passage of the
Boggs Act—albeit packaged in scientific-sounding language—and would do so again when
pushing for the 1956 Narcotic Control Act.
Yet in the 1950s, one concern overshadowed even that of youth delinquency: a fear of the
spread of communism. As Gilbert notes, both fears were crucial to the “very genuine concern
about social disintegration.”107 Anslinger, given his position, was uniquely positioned to exploit
them simultaneously.108 To do so, he conjured a centralized conspiracy from Communist China
that aimed to poison the moral resolve of the West by flooding teenagers with heroin. Major
newspapers across the country reported on Anslinger’s conspiratorial claims.109 Of course, this
Cold War narrative represented a slight remake of that of a decade earlier, where he argued
Japan weaponized opium against China and the West.110 And this would also not be the last time
Anslinger aligned narcotics with a foreign adversary, as he later argued that Cuba conspired to
import cocaine to the United States.111 Anslinger’s move to align the FBN with pressing matters
of foreign policy proved again and again to be a potent weapon in his bureaucratic arsenal. It
won him support not only in Congress but also with the public, given broader fears surrounding
Communist infiltration during the period. Those who challenged Anslinger’s punitive approach
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became susceptible to charges of sympathizing with communism, a quick way to become
persona non grata.112
Fears of heroin importation from China were not without merit, but Anslinger greatly
overstated the evidence for a centralized conspiracy from the highest levels of “Red China.” His
rhetoric on China grew more sensationalist in the years following the Kefauver Committee
hearings. In remarks before the United Nations in 1954, he argued Communist China had
developed a “20-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction among free peoples
through the sale of heroin and opium.”113 He continued by noting that “the narcotic menace from
Communist China [has mushroomed] into a multiheaded dragon threatening to mutilate and
destroy whole segments of populations.”114 Such rhetoric led to sensationalist pieces in the media
comparable to those covering the teenage drug scare. American Detective reported in 1954 that
“Hong Kong is a secret battlefront from which Communists hurl deadly weapon at American
youth—dope.”115 In advancing this Communist conspiracy, Anslinger was hardly troubled by
Hong Kong’s status as a British colony.116 The article elaborated that “[i]t is a real war, hot and
not cold, with real battle lines…—that the 250 agents of the Bureau of Narcotics of the United
States Treasury are waging against a quite real and solid and fiendish enemy—the warlords and
bureaucrats of Red China.”117 By frequently citing Anslinger, such articles helped tie the FBN’s
enforcement efforts to broader anti-communist goals, even when divorced from actual
geostrategic facts.
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While there is no doubt that China exported some heroin, Anslinger’s claim of a “20-year
plan,” which generated much uproar among the media and public, was unsubstantiated. In fact,
China’s communist regime actually aggressively cracked down on heroin use.118 Furthermore, as
Eric Schneider and Jonathan Marshall have documented, much of the heroin actually flowed out
of Nationalist, rather than Communist, China.119 Anslinger and the FBN chose to ignore this
uncomfortable reality, instead choosing to focus on condemning “Red China’s” alleged trade in
heroin. As Marshall shows, Anslinger all too often parroted propaganda straight from Nationalist
China, which had a substantial and willing audience in Washington.120 Political incentives drove
the often myopic focus on heroin from mainland China, especially given that Anslinger
acknowledged in 1953 that “[m]ost of the heroin smuggled into this country comes from old
stocks in Italy” and that “[m]uch of our heroin comes from Turkey.”121 As we will see, Senator
Price Daniel’s subcommittee would uncritically accept Anslinger’s rhetoric on China when
assessing the narcotics problem across the nation.
Although they were largely ignored in Congress, several contemporaries criticized
Anslinger’s dubious rhetoric on China. Some of his British contemporaries at the United Nations
Commission on Narcotics Drugs, of which Anslinger would be appointed chairman, expressed
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concerns about Anslinger’s more outlandish complaints, and even criticized him for his
“incompetence.”122 John Henry Walker of the British Home Office found Anslinger’s “annual
onslaughts on Red China” to be without basis in fact.123 Walker believed Anslinger’s more
outlandish slander was driven by the bureaucratic reality that he was “under pressure in
Washington and having to fight to keep his job.”124 The simple requirement of bureaucratic
survival in the 1950s helps explain why Anslinger continued to slander China in his push for
punitive legislation. When the merits of his agency were challenged, Anslinger could point to the
twin threats—teenage drug addiction and communist heroin—that his agency was addressing.
Anslinger also faced domestic criticism regarding his claims about China. One of the most
prominent of these critics was John O’Kearney, who argued in the liberal political magazine, The
Nation, that “to accuse Red China of plot and purpose on the simple basis of arrests of Chinese
engaged in the trade, as Anslinger apparently does, is no more justified than to blame the United
States for crimes committed by private American citizens in Africa.”125 O’Kearney noted that the
British in Hong Kong have found it “difficult to escape the conclusion that Chiang Kaishek’s
propagandists are having their effect on the Americans.” 126
Anslinger’s exaggerated rhetoric won the day. Armed with growing fears over
communism, and resurgent popular fears regarding teenage drug use, Anslinger could turn
towards pushing for even harsher legislation in Congress, where he found several allies,
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including Texas Senator Price Daniel. The same dynamics and instincts that led to the explosion
of the carceral later in the 20th century prompted the federal government to intensify the punitive
approach set out by the Boggs Act in the mid-1950s; any history of the narcotics-fueled rise of
mass incarceration is incomplete without an understanding of this crucial period.

V.

Price Daniel’s Narcotics Probe: “Doctor Versus Cop”

The conservative Democrat Price Daniel was elected to the Senate in 1952, after serving
as Attorney General of the State of Texas.127 While perhaps his greatest political achievement
was securing the land and mineral rights of the coastal tidelands for the state of Texas against the
federal government, the issue of narcotics proved to be central to his tenure in the Senate.128 The
issue of youth delinquency was particularly crucial to his political career, and he too was caught
up in the increasingly acute fears over a centralized and subversive Chinese heroin conspiracy.
Daniel, like Anslinger, profited off of the narcotics trade by using fears of it to improve his
political standing. With the public already aroused by Anslinger and his allies’ campaign for
“enlightened public opinion,” the stage was set for a push for even harsher legislation, even for
helpless addicts. 129 This push enabled social conservatives like Anslinger to project moral
absolutism and certainty at a time of immense social upheaval and a second perceived uptick in
narcotics use. This interplay between public outrage and a government-media complex eager to
further fan the flames culminated in some of the harshest narcotics legislation the nation would
ever see, despite dissent by key players such as the New York Academy of Medicine. Daniel
would benefit from these fears during his 1955 Narcotics probe, an investigation that traversed
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the country and generated media attention wherever it went from June to November 1955,
following in the tradition of the Kefauver hearings.130 The FBN went on tour with Daniel.
As the decade progressed, fears over teenage drug use and the “Red China” heroin
conspiracy ballooned. In a closed-door session before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Richard
Deverall, an anti-Communist labor representative stationed in Asia, testified that “[t]he greatest
service that the United States can do in this field, I think — and Mr. Onslinger [sic] has done a
magnificent job so far — is to give this fight, this hypodermic war of Red China against free
Asia the widest publicity.”131 Deverall noted that the “needles that are being stuck into the arms
and bodies of their young people are needles that are being filled with liquid from Red China. It
is one of the most vicious wars in modern history.”132 Under this framing, it was with narcotics,
rather than conventional arms or nuclear weapons, that communism battled capitalism. Two
weeks earlier, Anslinger had testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[heroin] is one
of the worst poisons known to man, and when you sell heroin, physical and moral destruction are
bound to follow.”133 With this outsized rhetoric, one begins to appreciate the atmosphere in
which Senator Daniel launched his narcotics probe. Furthermore, there was a perception that
youth delinquency and narcotics use had reached new heights, with rates of teenage narcotics
arrests creeping upwards in major cities between 1952 and 1954.134 Daniel, in particular,
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corresponded with several key figures in New York State, where the perception was that
narcotics use, particularly in the nation’s epicenter, New York City, had exploded in 1955.135
New York State Attorney General Jacob Javits noted in 1955 press release that “drug addiction
throughout the United States had spurted above the so-called ‘epidemic year’ of 1951.”136 In this
environment of perceived calamity, Daniel’s sub-committee was launched to investigate the
magnitude of the narcotics crisis and explore potential solutions.137 At this point, solutions on the
table included not only the harsher sentencing favored by Anslinger, but also the “clinic” plan,
which would allow doctors to prescribe low-cost narcotics as addicts sought treatment.
When Daniel launched his probe in June 1955, the New York Academy of Medicine
endorsed the clinic approach to treating drug addiction. This endorsement captured public
attention and credibility owing to the institutional prestige of the organization and the media
coverage it generated, although it was hardly the first such proposal.138 Anslinger had long been
critical of such proposals and was easily able to dismiss them, but the Academy’s endorsement
brought the clinic approach to the forefront over discussions about narcotics.139 In order “to take
the profit out of the illicit drug traffic,” the Academy proposed that “[t]he addict should be able
to obtain his drugs at low cost under Federal control, in conjunction with efforts to have him
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undergo withdrawal.”140 These New York doctors believed that Anslinger’s punitive approach,
which did not offer adequate treatment for addicts, incentivized crime since users would
desperately seek to acquire narcotics after being “dumped as a solitary figure, penniless, very
often friendless and without work, in a hostile society.”141 Notably, the report condemned the
approach under the Boggs Act, which, the Academy asserted, did not meaningfully “distinguish
between the addict and the commercial supplier.”142 It noted that mandatory minimums under the
“present punitive approach” only exacerbated the issue, as they reduced the discretion of
judges.143 The Academy argued that “[n]arcotic addicts should be considered sick persons and
should not be penalized for activities which stem primarily from their ill-conceived attempts to
alleviate their own suffering.”144 The Academy argued that legislation should explicitly
distinguish between addict and non-addict dealers of narcotics so that addicts could be treated
and non-addict traffickers could be prosecuted thoroughly, further contending that “the plan to
remove the profit would diminish illicit traffic.”145 Furthermore, the Academy diverged from the
FBN’s approach in that it favored educating adolescents on narcotics. 146 Ultimately, in weighing
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“the punitive as against the medical [approach to addiction],” the Academy found the former to
be deeply ineffective at solving the root of the problem and favored the latter.147 While cynically
one might argue that the Academy was trying to lobby for an increased role for doctors with this
proposal, the logic outlined in the proposal undergirded many subsequent non-punitive
approaches to drug control and has proven to be effective in countries such as Switzerland
roughly forty years after the report appeared.148
This endorsement of the clinical in favor of the punitive approach generated enormous
media coverage and political interest.149 A tangible alternative to the punitive approach had
manifested itself just as Daniel’s sub-committee began to investigate narcotics enforcement, and
Daniel and his staff monitored the debate intensively.150 Unsurprisingly, Anslinger “violently”
opposed the clinic approach, and aggressively moved to debunk it much as he did with the earlier
La Guardia Report.151 With his characteristic rhetorical flair, Anslinger retorted that “[i]f a plan
like that … is given any serious consideration at all, then a state and Federal building should be
constructed. On the first floor there should be a bar for alcoholics, on the second floor a narcotic
dispensary for all addicts and on the top floor a brothel for sex deviates.”152 Anslinger clearly
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aimed to position his approach of moral absolutism as the only logical alternative to the clinic
approach.153 This moral absolutism, as it often has in American history, proved to be exceedingly
effective in the face of public panic.154 For Anslinger, the furor over the clinic approach
represented a threat to his hegemony. Earlier in 1955, the American Bar Association and
American Medical Association had launched a joint investigation of current narcotics policy;
Anslinger could not escape the pressure building against his approach.155 As Daniel’s
subcommittee began to investigate the narcotics problem across the country, it faced a real
choice between the punitive approach favored by Anslinger and the clinic approach favored by
many doctors. Moreover, the latter had strong support from a rival group of experts who were
among the most trusted professionals in American society.156
From June 2 to December 15 of 1955, Daniel’s Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in the Federal Criminal Code traveled across the country, conducting 37 days of open hearings in
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cities across the country and hearing from more than 345 witnesses. 157 Five of these hearings
were held in New York City, the epicenter of heroin use in the country, and a state that possessed
outsized interest in the clinic approach given the endorsement of its academy of medicine.158 At
the first set of hearings held in New York City, Attorney General Javits illustrated epistemic
humility that the FBN lacked, as he expressed interest in the clinic approach “especially because
we know so little about the causes and the cures.”159 Daniel described the debate over the clinic
approach as “probably the most controversial issue today in the field of narcotics.”160 Yet
Anslinger’s rhetoric on narcotics, including his allegation of “a direct, deliberate plan by
Communist China to infest the United States with harmful narcotics,” colored the hearings.161
Participants frequently invoked the FBN commissioner, often referring to him as “Dr.
Anslinger.”162 Daniel was hardly troubled by the fact that the FBN district supervisor for New
York reported that “[w]e have not run across any material quantity of heroin which could be
traced back to Communist China in this area.”163 Anslinger’s presence loomed large over the
first set of hearings in New York, and he himself would testify in the second set of hearings.
At the second set of hearings in New York, held from September 19-21, discussion of the
clinic plan grew more contentious. Questions about the treatment of addicts who sold drugs
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became central to the debate. The FBN estimated that 70 percent of those who sold drugs were
addicts themselves, while the New York Academy of Medicine put the figure closer to 85
percent. No sensible discussion of narcotics policy could ignore the issue.164 For the FBN, this
figure indicated that addiction was a communicable disease, which quarantine and harsh
sentences for selling could combat.165 For the doctors, this figure meant that addicts were
desperate to find money to sustain their habits; the clinic proposal would kill two birds with one
stone by reducing the profits in selling narcotics and allowing them cheap access to the drug
while they were being treated to prevent them from resorting to crime. Five witnesses testified
before Daniel’s sub-committee advocating for the clinical approach.166
Anslinger moved swiftly to combat their arguments. Characteristically, he opened his
testimony by arguing that the clinic approach was “a proposal for the United States Government
to sell poison at reduced prices to its citizens.”167 He also noted that countries around the world
were moving to outlaw narcotics—of course, it was he himself who had exported this punitive
probationary approach at the United Nations. Secondly, he noted that earlier attempts of
municipal narcotics clinics had failed in the 1920s. Yet he refrained from mentioning that these
clinics bore little resemblance to those proposed by the New York Academy of Medicine and
that the federal government had shut those down as it shifted to more aggressive enforcement of
the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act and barred doctors from prescribing narcotics to patients.168
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Anslinger finally argued that the clinical plan would “increase [addiction] threefold because the
addict spreads addiction,” although he provided neither research nor data to support that
figure.169 Senator Daniel found this fear of spreading addiction through the clinics to be
compelling, even though Anslinger assumed that the dynamics of the narcotics trade would
remain constant despite the presence of the clinics.
A real debate over the future of federal narcotics policy occurred at Daniel’s New York
City hearings. Anslinger had been put on the defensive by a new group of expert witnesses who
argued for the clinic approach. TIME reported that the clinic proposal “split the experts—doctors
and law enforcers—right down the middle. After the hearings they were farther apart than ever
before. About all they had been able to agree on were the basic facts.”170 Given its mission of
determining suitable legislation, Daniel’s subcommittee had a genuine opportunity to challenge
Anslinger’s punitive approach. But the political optics of the clinic approach—as Anslinger had
so clearly demonstrated with his fiery rhetoric—made it difficult for a Texas Senator to give it
serious consideration.171
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Beyond attempting to elucidate a solution for the nationwide narcotics problem, Daniel’s
subcommittee served a manifestly political purpose. As Kefauver had demonstrated with his
strong showing in the 1952 Democratic Primary, chairing sensational hearings was a surefire
way for a senator to raise his profile.172 And Anslinger’s bureaucratic success highlighted how
fears of narcotics could be effectively wielded to garner political support. Daniel clearly intended
to use his narcotics probe to raise his profile across his home state, given that he held hearings in
Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio.173 Texas was significantly
overrepresented at these hearings, with Daniel holding ten days of open hearings in its largest
cities. This was no coincidence.174
It was an open secret that Daniel hoped to be governor of Texas. Therefore, he intended
to position himself as a crusader against narcotics at the hearings held in his state. The journalist
Carl Freund’s article “Daniel Probe may Launch His Candidacy,” infuriated Daniel so much that
he wrote a letter to Freund denying that political calculations factored into his performance at the
Texas hearings.175 Such denials were hardly convincing. Additionally, Daniel’s office worked
with state press to ensure that the already-anticipated hearings were televised in order to generate
as much publicity as possible.176 Citing Daniel’s hearings, the Radio/Television Daily noted that
subcommittee. From the PD Papers, various letters from constituents confirm that Daniel’s black and white
approach was well-received.
172
And Daniel’s hearings, in both Texas and across the country, were sensational. See Letter from Tom Devlin to
Price Daniel, December 19, 1955, Box 82, PD Papers. Tom Devlin, a reporter for the Los Angeles Examiner, noted
to Daniel that “Ordinarily Senate subcommittees are cut-and-dried, affairs, but not yours.” He elaborated that
“[w]hen you put the peddlers, users and hookers on the stand and busted the situation wide open at Temple and
Figueroa streets, ten minutes’ walk from your hearing in the Federal Court House, I knew that neither you nor you
subcommittee were ordinary. That’s why the Los Angeles Examiner gave you subcommittee the coverage it
deserved.”
173
U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee On Improvements in the Federal Criminal Code, "Illicit Narcotics Traffic
Hearings: Part 7," October 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and December 14, 15, 1955, 1321.
174
Daniel’s hearings received heavy press coverage by local Texas media. See Box 150, PD Papers.
175
Letter from Price Daniel to Carl Freund, October 28, 1955, Box 83, PD Papers.
176
Letter from Paul E. Tart to Price Daniel, October 27, 1955 and Letter from Price Daniel to Paul E. Tart, October
29, 1955, Box 83, PD Papers. Taft wrote Daniel to thank him “for the privilege of telecasting [his] Hearings from
Houston last week” and noted that “[w]e have received a great deal of comment and all of it has been good.” Daniel

Horvath 42
“the conduct in Texas is evidence that broadcasters, when invited, will give government full
measure of public service.”177 Furthermore, FBN agents feared that because of Daniel’s “desires
to be the next Governor of the State of Texas,” he would exaggerate the magnitude of the
narcotics issue in San Antonio at the hearings, which risked placing the “Bureau in an
embarrassing position.”178 Daniel exaggerated the crisis to magnify the potential impact of his
crusade, even though such exaggeration would make the FBN’s current enforcement look
ineffective.179
In the summer of 1955, Daniel was acutely aware that a crusade against narcotics could
make for effective campaign material in his race for governor next year. Departing from the
China focus of previous hearings, Daniel instead emphasized the narcotics traffic from Mexico,
an issue that touched on racial tensions in Texas.180 Furthermore, Daniel largely condemned the
clinic approach, allowing for less debate than in the New York hearings. As one San Antonio
lawyer noted, “[w]hen Daniel did not receive the answer he wanted the witness to give, he
provided the answer for him.”181 Daniel’s annotations of critical appraisals of the FBN’s
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approach corroborate that he was not interested in hearing alternatives.182 From the very
beginning Daniel conferenced with Anslinger to plan the hearings. Furthermore, Wayland Lee
Speer, special investigator for the subcommittee, had worked for the FBN for 18 years prior to
his appointment.183 Daniel’s approach at the hearings, though not effective at actually obtaining
effective solutions to the narcotics approach, proved to be very fruitful in building his reputation
both in Texas and in Congress.184 Daniel’s constituents were fired up about the problem of
narcotics use, particularly among teenagers, and Daniel stood out as a champion against the
apparent epidemic, an epidemic which the state, through the media, had amplified.
Ultimately, Daniel’s subcommittee endorsed the punitive sentences favored by Anslinger
and the FBN.185 In its preliminary report, the subcommittee called for an increase in mandatory
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minimum sentencing and the death penalty for those who sold heroin to minors.186 Daniel
garnered significant media attention for his support of the death penalty in this case, and many of
his constituents praised his zeal on the issue. The cartoon below illustrates how Daniel’s
reputation as a “law and order” senator profited from his narcotics probe and call for the death
penalty. It also illustrates the seductively simplistic logic that was used to justify the punitive
approach.187 Borrowing heavily from Anslinger, the committee concluded that “[s]ubversion
through drug addiction is an established aim of Communist China.”188 It also called for
enhancing the enforcement capabilities of law
enforcement, including a wiretapping provision
that came under fire by advocates for civil
liberties. Daniel’s subcommittee sided with
Anslinger in dismissing the clinic approach,
concluding that “we believe the thought of
permanently maintaining drug addiction with
‘sustaining’ doses of narcotic drugs to the addict
to be utterly repugnant to the moral principles
inherent in our laws and the character of our
people.”189 The “contagious” nature of drug addiction was also of central concern. Just as it had
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in the 1920s, the federal government had killed the clinic system. And the harsher mandatory
minimums proposed by the subcommittee meant that small-time dealers, such as Zaragoza,
desperate to fund their own personal addiction, would face long sentences even for selling small
amounts of narcotics. Moral absolutism triumphed as a moral panic raged.

VI.

“‘Remember the Alamo’ Kind of Mad” to “A Hotter War on Dope”:
The 1956 Narcotic Control Act
With the recommendation of Daniel’s subcommittee in the Senate, as well as Boggs’

Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, the stage was set for more punitive
legislation that would further empower Anslinger and the FBN.190 In pushing for this punitive
legislation, as well as setting the stage for his candidacy for Texas Governor, Daniel’s office
commenced a media blitzkrieg. Much of the media, with a few notable exceptions, proved
willing to be Daniel’s mouthpiece. This interplay between a press eager to cover sensational
material and public officials eager to provide such sensational material is crucial to
understanding the Federal Government’s shift towards punitive narcotics enforcement in the
1950s. It helps explain the moral panic that occurred across Texas and the nation, culminating in
the extraordinarily harsh sentencing contained in the 1956 Narcotic Control Act, often referred to
as the Daniel Act. Even though Daniel only estimated there were around 60,000 addicts across
the country, moral panic ensued.
During 1956, Daniel’s office worked with the media to arouse public outrage regarding
the narcotics problem. Daniel, who launched his gubernatorial campaign in June, knew that the
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Narcotic Control Act represented a major victory of his tenure in the Senate that he could
campaign on. When the legislation passed on July 9, it represented a signature, hard-hitting piece
of legislation for his campaign to advertise. The conservative Texan could point to the death
penalty provision in the legislation to gin up support; the clinic approach simply did not possess
the same political appeal. Thus, his office spent much of the first half of 1956 not only pushing
for the legislation but also working to widely publicize his efforts across Texas and the nation. A
memo to Daniel on January 20th noted that “it would be appropriate to have the many favorable
remarks which your colleagues made about you when the narcotics bill was introduced
mimeographed or reproduced in some manner and distributed to appropriate individuals and
organizations throughout the state.”191 By “[distributing] these remarks to various dailies and
weeklies in the state,” Daniel laid the groundwork for a key campaign point.192 Coverage of his
subcommittee’s findings in the New York Daily News in January and February of 1956 further
bolstered Daniel’s national visibility and reputation.193 The New York Daily News had the largest
circulation in the country and, as one letter to Daniel noted, “[t]he paper is read by all classes of
people. That’s why it is so important.”194
Daniel’s subcommittee and staff, like Anslinger, waged war against any piece of media
that did not conform with their approach to narcotics enforcement. Regarding a January 31
Washington Post satirical article, “Shot With Morphine, He Viewed Red Skelton,” Speer wrote
to Daniel in an office memo that the article was a “good example of completely irresponsible
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writing. I fail to detect any humour in such dangerous statements.” 195 Similar to Anslinger,
Daniel’s subcommittee viewed any portrayal that even slightly downplayed the risks of narcotics
use, even if accurate, as being “irresponsible.” Speer corresponded with Anslinger regarding the
film, The Man with the Golden Arm, which depicted drug addiction in a manner that absolutely
enraged Anslinger.196 The two men seemed to share not only the same perspective on policy but
also a puritanical code of social decorum and culture. The men concluded that the film was “a
hodgepodge of dissolute sex, gambling, shoplifting and sadistic cruelty, the narcotic theme being
interjected with an eye on the possible box office. There is nothing absolutely nothing [sic]
constructive in the picture.”197 They found the film to be “dangerous for impressionable young
people,” and objected to Frankie Machine’s (Frank Sinatra) recovery from drug addiction.198
Rather than depict a recovery, “a true ending would show the vacillating addict either
permanently confined or destroying himself.”199 This view of addiction requiring permanent
confinement illustrates why the clinic approach failed to gain traction in Daniel’s subcommittee.
Anslinger worked hard to censor the film, which departed from the Hollywood policy of not
depicting narcotics addiction, a policy which Anslinger had strongly pushed for.200 Daniel
himself refused to endorse the film. When asked by a theater manager in Fort Worth to do so, he
refused because he believed that “this is the type of document that every man, woman, and
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teenager should see for their education and enlightenment.”201 Anslinger and Speer polemicized
against a film that some viewed as material that would stem drug addiction. Nor was The Man
with the Golden Arm the only film that Speer and the FBN politically and culturally attacked.202
This condemnation of alternative narratives of depiction further highlights how Daniel and his
FBN-affiliated subcommittee aligned with Anslinger throughout their hearings and worked to
control the narrative.
Daniel’s most important media effort in 1956 took the form of circulating the 15-minute
radio tape “Narcotics Traffic U.S.A.” and the 28-minute film “Dope Traffic U.S.A.” across the
state of Texas. In the radio broadcast, Daniel described narcotics in hyperbolic terms as “the
most dangerous social cancer within our society,” arguing that addiction “is indeed murder on
the installment plan.”203 He called for a “vigorous crusade to stamp out illegal dope smuggling
and peddling.”204 On the TV broadcast, Daniel described narcotics as “the world’s most vicious
racket” and cited a conspiracy from “Red China” as well as concerns “about the smuggling of
marihuana and heroin from Mexico.”205 He reported that “Chinese heroin filtered across the
nation, creating new addicts wherever it went.”206 The film noted that “[d]rug addiction is
contagious. Addicts spread the habit to their families, their friends and associates. Many times
it’s no accident.”207 These short tapes ostensibly summarized the findings of Daniel’s
subcommittee and served as a public service announcement regarding the narcotics epidemic.
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Yet both effusively praised the work of Daniel. In his telegrams to 67 radio stations and 39 TV
stations across his home state, Daniel made sure to assert that “[m]aterial is entirely
nonpolitical.”208 Yet it was no coincidence that Daniel hoped to air these tapes across Texas in
the first two weeks of June, just as he was launching his gubernatorial campaign. Most stations
were glad to comply, offering him free publicity in preparation for what would be a contested
primary. KWBU in Corpus Christi thanked Daniel and noted that “this station is anxious at all
times to cooperate with every government agency in presenting facts to our public.”209 These
“facts” were carefully crafted to generate support for Daniel and Anslinger’s approach. Only one
radio station declined Daniel’s request. KCRS in Midland noted in a wire to Daniel that “due to
the political campaign feel we can’t play it on non-commercial basis.”210 The federal tax dollars
allocated to Daniel’s subcommittee were being used to produce a sensational film that paved the
way for Daniel’s gubernatorial campaign.
Daniel’s radio and TV broadcasts indeed stirred up great anger in Texas regarding the
issue of narcotics. His office was inundated with letters from angry constituents who wrote to
him after viewing the broadcasts thanking him for his hard work against the scourge. Some even
noted that his hard work on narcotics had changed their views of Daniel. The radio and TV
stations who broadcasted the tapes reported similar experiences with their viewers. Highlighting
the scale of the outrage, KEYS RADIO’S show, “Pulse Survey,” asked listeners over the first two
weeks of June to sign on to a “letter to [Daniel] urging that [he] continue [his] admirable fight to
stamp out the vicious narcotic traffic.”211 On a show with roughly 80,000 daily listeners, 510
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signed on to the letter. In the letter to Daniel, Allan Dale of KEYS noted that “[t]he people whose
names appear on this letter are “Remember the Alamo” kind of mad and as a Native Texas [sic]
you know what that means.”212 This atmosphere of anger helps explain why Daniel’s bill
garnered support throughout Congress, despite some protestations.
One such sticking point was over the wiretapping provision in Daniel’s bill, a provision
that Daniel eventually dropped due to mounting criticism from civil liberties advocates. Daniel,
however, maintained support for the provision. The prospect of delaying legislation that
represented a major win for his gubernatorial campaign to advertise was not appealing. One
correspondence with two of his constituents was telling. Helen and Robert Jung noted to Daniel
that “Wire tapping is, at best, the sneak tactic of a totalitarian state or the back alley method of
the private detective…. The belief that the ends justify the means is the root and core of the
Communistic system.”213 In response, Daniel reported that “[r]ealizing that the opposition to the
wire-interception would delay passage of the entire beneficial legislation, I agreed to accept an
amendment which eliminated this provision from the bill and substituted a section which makes
it a criminal offense to use the telephone to engage in the illicit narcotics traffic.”214 Further
elaborating, he wrote that “I am still of the opinion… that the wire-interception provision would
be beneficial to efforts to eliminate the illicit traffic.”215 Political calculations partially explain
his hesitancy for any “delay,” and the belief that “the ends justify the means” was fundamental to
the punitive approach.216 In circumstances of panic and outrage, any sentence, no matter how
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harsh, could be justified. As Daniel noted on May 31, “the Senator from New York urges us not
to raise penalties, but to place our major emphasis on a treatment and rehabilitation program. I
say to the Senator from New York: ‘You do not ‘treat and rehabilitate a drug peddler.’”217 Of
course, given the broader fears over Communism and youth delinquency, most of Daniel’s
colleagues willingly joined the crusade against narcotics spearheaded by the FBN.
On July 9, the Narcotic Control Act passed, drastically raising penalties above the level
established by the Boggs Act. The provision for the death penalty at jury discretion, championed
by Daniel, won the senator much coverage. Anslinger, too, won praise for his role in the crusade,
as U.S. News and World Report named him a person of the week following the passage of
Daniel’s legislation. Regarding the death penalty provision, Anslinger remarked that “I’d like to
throw the switch myself on drug peddlers who sell their poison to minors.”218 Anslinger had
reason to celebrate; the federal government had come in with an aggressive law-enforcementoriented intervention. The punitive approach had won the day as a result of moral panic. The
FBN, though not indefinitely, was able to survive mounting criticism.
Daniel, too, had reason to celebrate. In the 1956 Texas gubernatorial primary, he
triumphed in a contested race against his more liberal intraparty rival Ralph Yarborough, who
managed to force a runoff on August 25.219 During his campaign, he could point to the Narcotic
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Control Act as a major legislative victory during his tenure in the Senate. On July 11, Daniel’s
campaign proudly reported in a press release a telegram from Anslinger that noted:
THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS EXTENDS ITS HEARTIEST
CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND YOUR COMMITTEE ON THE
TRIUMPHANT CULMINATION OF YOUR SEDULOUS AND TENACIOUS
ATTACK ON THE NARCOTIC MENACE. THE PROMPT PASSAGE OF THE
NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT OF 1956 GIVES US OUR GREATEST SINGLE
WEAPON TO COMBAT THE VICIOUS TRAFFICERS AND SUPPRESS THE
ABUSE OF NARCOTICS DRUGS [sic].220
Both Anslinger and Daniel had profited from the probe. Anslinger secured the harsher sentences
he had so desperately craved throughout the decade, and Daniel secured a major legislative win
for his tenure in the Senate. Of course, Daniel truly was appalled narcotics use, as was every
expert who attempted to address the problem during the decade. Yet one cannot help but believe
that some of his myopia regarding alternatives to the punitive approach was driven by political
calculations.

VII.

Conclusion

In 1958, Anslinger wrote to Daniel proudly reflecting that “[h]oodlums throughout this
country are wary of the sharp teeth of the Daniel-Boggs Act.”221 He further rejoiced that “[a]lso
under this legislation, Gilbert M. Zaragoza in Los Angeles was sentenced to a life term for
selling heroin to 17 year olds.”222 This was the immediate legacy of Anslinger’s push for a
harsher federal narcotics policy in the 1950s. Yet the significance of this period goes far beyond
the suffering of tragic individuals such as Zaragoza.
With a media eager for sensational headlines concerning teenage addiction stemming
from “Red China’s” heroin and key congressional allies like Senator Daniel, the FBN possessed
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an unprecedented ability to significantly alter both public opinion and the nation’s legislative
agenda; the line between the executive and legislative branches had blurred in post-New Deal
America, with administrative agencies using their institutional cachet to suppress alternative
narratives. The FBN, emblematic of the burgeoning administrative state, was able to discredit
dissenting organizations and individuals such as the New York Academy of Medicine. Even as
this Anslinger-centered complex came under fire, it was able to exploit and exaggerate fears of
teenage addiction to secure its preferred punitive legislation. The double game Anslinger
played—stirring fears of teenage addiction while simultaneously downplaying its scope to lobby
for the efficacy of his agency’s anti-narcotics enforcement—highlights the seemingly
paradoxical dynamics that guided his agency. Importantly for this study, the magnitude of these
fears dwarfed the actual scope of addiction across the country, but the FBN provided a simplistic
way to assuage raw concerns over youth delinquency and Communism in a rapidly evolving
country. It spoke to a deeply ingrained fear of the corruption of white youth, an anxiety that long
predated Daniel or Anslinger and continues to endure long after their deaths. Complementing
these domestic fears, narcotics control came to be seen as a key tool of foreign policy, a role it
continues to play today.
The contours of the present-day debate over the proper approach to drug enforcement had
been thoroughly sketched in the 1950s. Scholars who focus merely on absolute numbers of
incarcerated individuals when tracing the expansion of the war on drugs risk missing the reality
that the underlying dynamics developed in the 1950s. The rhetoric surrounding narcotics in the
1950s far outpaced the absolute numbers of arrests and convictions. This re-periodization
suggests that the impulse for a punitive incarceration approach towards narcotics addicts
predated the infrastructure necessary for mass incarceration. The absolute punitive sentences
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favored by Anslinger and Daniel represented an opportunity for the burgeoning state to project
an aura of control in a country that perceived itself as experiencing rapid social change,
especially with regard to family structure, youth independence and rebellion, and incipient urban
racial integration. Baffling and discomforting teenage behaviors were conflated with drug use
and drug culture, and more ominously, cultural authorities and politicians conjured the specter
that minority drug users were a threat to white teenagers. The epistemology of narcotics
developed in this decade proved remarkably enduring. Indeed, if Daniel and the country had
truly listened to critics during his narcotics probe, one cannot help but wonder whether things
may have turned out differently for figures like Zaragoza and the many other nameless
individuals who were incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses in the 20th and 21st centuries.223
Yet moral absolutism was more profitable politically than a more nuanced approach, more
expedient than the extended work of public health and social reform, and thus the federal
government doubled down on the punitive approach as a disproportionate panic over narcotics
use raged across the country.

Word Count: 12,481
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In 2017, 1,489,363 Americans were incarcerated in federal or state prisons, with drug offenses representing
roughly 50 and 15% of those convictions respectively. See “Prisoners in 2017,” U.S. Department of Justice: Bureau
of Justice Statistics, April, 2019. Such a figure dwarfs the incarceration numbers of 1980, when “just” 329,122
Americans were imprisoned in federal or state prisons. See “Prisoners in 1980,” U.S. Department of Justice: Bureau
of Justice Statistics, May, 1981. A continued belief in the merits of long mandatory sentencing—a belief clearly
present in the 1950s—helps explain this drastic increase.
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